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ABSTRACT
Checklists are used by the flight crew to properly configure an aircraft
for safe flight and to ensure a high level of safety throughout the duration of
the flight. In addition, the checklist provides a sequential framework to meet
cockpit operational requirements, and it fosters cross-checking of the flight
deck configuration among crew members.
This study examined the feasibility of integrating multiple checklists for
non-normal procedures into a single procedure for a typical transport aircraft.
For the purposes of this report, a typical transport aircraft is one that represents
a midpoint between early generation aircraft (B-727/737-200 and DC-10) and
modern glass cockpit aircraft (B747-400/777 and MD-11). In this report,
potential conflicts among non-normal checklist items during multiple failure
situations for a transport aircraft are identified and analyzed. The non-normal
checklist procedure that would take precedence for each of the identified
multiple failure flight conditions is also identified. The rationale behind this
research is that potential conflicts among checklist items might exist when
integrating multiple checklists for non-normal procedures into a single
checklist.
As a rule, multiple failures occurring in today's highly automated and
redundant system transport aircraft are extremely improbable. In addition, as
shown in this analysis, conflicts among checklist items in a multiple failure
flight condition are exceedingly unlikely. The possibility of a multiple failure
flight condition occurring with a conflict among checklist items is so remote
that integration of the non-normal checklists into a single checklist appears to
be a plausible option.
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INTRODUCTION
Checklists are used by the flight crew to properly configure an aircraft
for safe flight and to ensure a high level of safety throughout the duration of
the flight (Turner and Huntley, 1990). In addition, the checklist provides a
sequential framework to meet cockpit operational requirements, and it fosters
cross-checking of the flight deck configuration among crew members (Degani
and Weiner, 1990). As part of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of an
aircraft, pilots carry normal and non-normal checklist procedures on every
flight. Within this report, a normal checklist is defined as a procedure used by
the flight crew to ensure the airplane condition is acceptable for flight and that
the cockpit is correctly configured for each phase of flight. This procedure
assumes that all systems are operating normally and that automated features
are fully utilized (Boeing, 1990). A non-normal checklist is defined as a
procedure used by the flight crew to cope with non-normal situations (i.e., a
failure).
Traditionally, these normal and non-normal checklists have been paper
checklists. However, checklists can exist in a variety of different formats -
mechanical, audio, or electronic (Degani and Weiner, 1991). For example, the
Boeing 777 has incorporated an electronic checklist (ECL) function onto the
flight deck which is accessed interactively on multifunctional displays via
cursor control input devices (Crane, Bang and Hartel, 1994). The ECL function
contains all normal and non-normal checklists (total of 318), provides
placeholding capability, and provides linkages to EICAS (Engine Indicating
and Crew Alerting Systems) alert messages that ensure proper checklist access.
In older turbojet transport aircraft (e.g., B-727, B-747-200, L-1011, DC-10
and B-707) with systems having relatively little automation, multiple failures
could require substantially different procedures (checklists) than when
operating in normal configurations. As an example, up to eight checklists are
required to fly a B-727 on approach with two engines shutdown. These
checklists, each containing several steps, are:
1. Engine Failure (or Fire, Severe Damage or Separation) for first engine.
2. Engine Failure (or Fire, Severe Damage or Separation) for second engine.
3. Engine Restart for first and second engine (if appropriate).
4. Fuel Dumping (if appropriate).
5. Loss of Two Generators.
6. Cabin Notification and Preparation
7. Approach Descent Checklist.
8. Final Descent Checklist.
Integrated checklists that provided complex ordering of priorities for
multiple failures (i.e. loss of more than one engine, loss of two hydraulic
systems, etc.) did exist in some of the older turbojet aircraft. When Pan
American Pacific Division was acquired by United Airlines in 1986, they
brought with them the concept of a single integrated checklist for complex
procedures (multiple failures) which replaced the need for multiple checklists
in the cockpit. The integrated checklist helped to alleviate problems of pilot
omission since there was just one source of information from which to work.
The proliferation of automation in modern glass cockpit transport
aircraft (e.g., B747-400, MD-11, and B-777) has had a significant effect on crew
procedures and crew workload. Automation has typically reduced the number
of checklist items in the normal and non-normal procedures that the crew has
to complete in order to properly configure the aircraft for safe flight. For
example, the B-757/767's electrical system incorporates sophisticated load
shedding logic, making the only pilot action that of starting the auxiliary
power unit (APU) when the electrical system fails. However, modern aircrMt
automation, being extremely complex, can increase crew workload if the
automation is confusing to the flight crew.
Since automation may fail, there are new checklists associated with
these failures. This increase in checklists could potentially lead to crew
confusion if there are multiple checklists that need to be performed and if
these checklists had items that were in conflict. The thrust of the current
study was to determine for multiple failure flight conditions:
- if such conflicts among checklists items exists
- the probability of these failures occurring
- which checklist should take precedence.
The rationale behind this research is that potential conflicts might exist when
integrating multiple checklists for non-normal procedures into a single
checklist. This research was conducted in partial fulfillment of the Master of
Science degree with The George Washington University.
APPROACH
A twin-engine transport with advances in propulsion, aerodynamics,
avionics and materials over early generation transport aircraft was chosen as
the aircraft in this study because it represents a midpoint between early
generation aircraft (B-727/737-200/747-200) and modern glass cockpit aircraft
(B747-400/777 and MD-11). To identify the potential conflicts among checklist
items during a multiple failure of this transport aircraft, an EXCEL database
was developed listing the Non-Normal Checklist procedures in columns and
the equipment/instruments specified as checklist items in rows. The actual
operations manual for the transport aircraft chosen for this study provided the
information necessary for the development of this spreadsheet. Only those
non-normal checklist procedures (45 total) which required action by a crew
member were included in the spreadsheet. Certain non-normal procedures
had only the statement "crew awareness" with no procedural steps listed.
These procedures assume the associated message is informational or that the
required crew action is obvious (Boeing, 1990).
Cross-checking the EXCEL database for conflicting commands of
common checklist items for the non-normal procedures provided input for
another spreadsheet. This reduced spreadsheet (same row/column format as
specified above) listed only the non-normal checklist procedures in which
there were conflicting commands of common checklist items (Appendix A).
For example, the isolation switch in this aircraft is specified ON in the Engine
Fire, Severe Damage or Separation Non-Normal Checklist and specified OFF
in the Bleed Duct Leak Non-Normal Checklist. Of the original 89
equipment/instruments, listed in row format, only 18 of them had conflicting
commands in the non-normal checklist procedures. General descriptions of
these 18 instruments and their positions in the non-normal checklists are
discussed in Appendix B. The possibility of simultaneous occurrences of these
non-normal checklists, thus creating conflicts, during a typical flight are also
examined in Appendix B. The conclusions drawn in Appendix B were
derived through in-depth discussions with an experienced transport aircraft
captain (retired).
RESULTS
Table 1 identifies the six checklist items that have conflicting
commands for possible multiple failure combinations in the transport aircraft
chosen for this study. Table 1 also specifies the likelihood of each failure
condition (where applicable) and the non-normal checklist having precedence
in each of the possible multiple failure conditions.
Table 1. Conflicts in Non-Normal Checklist Items for Possible Multiple
Failure Combinations
Checklist
item
Landing
Gear
Isolation
Switch
Pack
Control
Selector
Alternate
Flaps
Selector
Alternate
Flaps
Switch
Fuel Pump
Switches
Multiple Failure Combinations For Non-Normal
Checklist name, item position and
estimated qualitative probability of
failure condition
Hydraulic
System(s)
Pressure
Engine
Failure
Shutdown
Smoke
Removal
Leading
Edge Slat
Asymmetry
Leading
Edge Slat
Asymmetry
Low Fuel
OFF
ON
AUTO
SET
flaps as
require
d
ALTN
to TE
switch
ON
probable
improbable
rl/a
probable
probable
n/a
Procedures
Checklist name, item position and
estimated qualitative probability of
failure condition
Gear Doors
Bleed Duct
Leak
Pack
Temperature
Trailing
Edge Flap
Asymmetry
Trailing
Edge Flap
Asymmetry
Gear
Disagree
UP
OFF
OFF
Set
FLAPS
1
ALTN
to LE
switch
OFF
probable
improbable
probable
probable
probable
improbable
Checklist name
that has
precedence
Hydraulic
System(s)
Pressure
Bleed Duct Leak
Smoke Removal
Neither; Similar
to a zero-flap
approach
Neither; Similar
to a zero-flap
approach
Gear Disagree
The probability estimates featured in Table 1 are based on personal
interpretations of FAR 25.1309 and AC 25.1309-1a and on discussions with an
experienced transport pilot. The estimated qualitative probability of failure for
the smoke removal checklist and the low fuel checklist are not specified in
Table 1 since these conditions are not always directly related to a system(s)
failure. Table 2 shows the relationship between the failure condition classes
and failure occurrence probabilities as defined in FAA specifications (FAR
25.1309; AC 25.1309-1a, 1988).
Table 2. Relationship Between Failure Condition Classes and Failure
Probabilities
Failure Condition Qualitative Probabilit_
Minor Probable
Major Improbable
Catastrophic Extremely Improbable
Quantitative Probability
> 1E-05
< 1E-05 but > 1E-09
< 1E-09
The remainder of this section will have the following format to discuss
the results of Table 1:
1. A brief description of the checklist item is given.
2. The commanded position of the checklist item for each non-normal
procedure in the identified possible multiple failure scenario is
highlighted.
3. The non-normal checklist having precedence in the multiple failure
scenario is identified.
Checklist item: Landing gear
The landing gear system is controlled by the Landing Gear lever which
has three positions (UP, OFF, and DN). On the ground, the Landing Gear
lever is prevented from being moved to the UP position by the lever lock.
The lever lock can be manually overridden by pushing the Lever Lock
Override Switch if retraction is desired. In the OFF position, the landing gear
system is depressurized. All gears and doors are held in the retracted position
by a mechanical lock (uplock).
Non-Normal Checklist #1" Hydraulic System(s) Pressure
If there was a hydraulic system pressure failure in the left and center
hydraulic systems, the landing gear is turned OFF and an alternate gear
extension system pushes it down. Then the main Landing Gear is put in the
DN position so that it's position is consistent with that of the alternate gear
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extension system. This alternative flap operation and alternative gear
extension may also be required if there was a hydraulic system pressure failure
in the left and center systems or in the left system only.
Non-Normal Checklist #2: Gear Doors
If the gear doors do not fully close and the gear lever is in the off
position, then the pilot puts the Landing Gear UP.
If there were a gear doors failure and a hydraulic system(s) pressure
failure occurring at the same time, the pilot would follow the checklist for the
latter situation because he/she doesn't want to "scrape metal" upon landing.
If the gear doors don't close, the pilot may be forced to refuel at an airport
enroute or return to the departure airport because of the increase in drag
associated with the open doors.
Checklist item: Isolation Switch
Normally, the Isolation Switch is closed (off). The Isolation Switch
isolates (splits in half) the pneumatic system of the aircraft. Failure on one
side of the system doesn't affect the other side. Pneumatic air is used for
pressurization, starting the aircraft, and icing prevention on the wings and
engines. The engine bleed air (pneumatic air) has a very high temperature
and pressure and it's extracted from either the low stage or the high stage
(further down the engine) source. Extracting the air reduces the thrust to the
engine. During takeoff, the engine bleed air is taken from the low stage
source. At low power settings, the low stage pressure isn't powerful enough to
operate the system so the air is extracted from the high stage pressure source.
The pneumatic air usually comes from the low stage source.
Non-Normal Checklist #1: Bleed Duct Leak
During a bleed duct leak, the pilot doesn't want to add pneumatic air to
the leaking component, so he/she turns the isolation valve OFF.
Non-Normal Checklist #2: Engine Failure Shutdown
During this procedure, the engine is turned off. The pilot can reroute
the pneumatic air by turning the Isolation Switch ON thus supplying hot air
(from the operational-engine) for the wing anti-ice (if necessary).
A conflict in the position of the isolation switch can exist if the aircraft
experiences an engine failure and a bleed duct leak on the opposite side of the
failed engine. In this multiple failure situation, the pilot would turn the
isolation switch off and perform an emergency descent procedure. The bleed
duct leak procedure takes precedence over the engine failure procedure since a
bleed duct leak can damage electrical wire insulation and can weaken
aluminum near the affected area of the leak. When an aircraft has a bleed
duct leak, the pilot must take special caution to avoid icing situations because
the isolation switch must remain off which disables the wing anti-ice for the
affected side of the aircraft.
Checklist item: Pack Control Selector
There are 2 packs in this transport aircraft and either pack will maintain
pressurization of the aircraft. These packs supply air through ducting to flight
deck, forward cabin, and aft cabin.
Non-Normal Checklist #1: Pack Temperature
The pack temperature is automatically controlled by a specified dial
setting. These settings are STBY-C (cold), STBY-W (warm), and STBY-N
(normal). If an overheat or fault in the associated zone temperature system is
sensed, the INOP light comes on. The pilot should select STBY-N first. If the
compartment temperature becomes unacceptably warm or cool select STBY-C
or STBY-W, respectively. If INOP light does not extinguish, turn the Pack
Control Selector OFF for the associated zone temperature system.
Non-Normal Checklist #2: Smoke Removal
The Pack Control Selectors remain on AUTO. The pilot should raise
the cabin altitude which will open the outflow valve to a more open position
thus enabling more air flow through the cabin. The outflow valve will open
wider because there's less pressure in the cabin.
A conflict occurs in the positioning of the pack control selector in the
smoke removal procedure and the pack temperature non-normal procedure.
Due to it's serious nature, the smoke removal procedure takes precedence
over the pack temperature procedure. If the smoke can not be removed, the
pilot must accomplish the earliest possible descent, landing and passenger
evacuation.
Checklist items: Alternate Flaps Selector and Alternate Flaps Switch
(Note: These two checklist items are involved in the same multiple failure
combination so they are discussed in detail together.)
Flap and slat position is controlled with the Flap Lever. When the Flap
Lever is in the UP detent, all flaps and slats are retracted and the flap position
indicator points to UP. Moving the flap lever to position 1 signals the slats
and flaps to extend to position 1. Placing the flap lever to position 5, 15, or 20
signals the flaps to extend to the selected position. The slats remain in the
takeoff (intermediate extended) position. Moving the flap lever to position 25
signals the flap to extend to the selected setting and the slats to extend to their
landing (fully extended) position.
An alternate flap drive system allows the flap Power Drive Units
(PDUs) to be driven by electric motors rather than hydraulic power. During
normal operations the Alternate Flaps Selector is in the NORM (normal)
position. There are two Alternate Flaps Switches, one for the leading edge
drive system and one for the trailing edge drive system. When the Alternate
Flaps Switch is pushed on, ALTN appears in the switch. Rotating the
Alternate Flaps Selector signals the flaps and slats to move to the pilot selected
position (UP, 1, 5, 15, 20 or 25). Only slat asymmetry protection is provided
during alternate operations.
The electrical system is a lot slower than the hydraulic system when
moving the flaps/slats. Also, the leading edge devices have a more
pronounced effect on landing speed than the trailing edge devices (e.g. LE slats
reduce stall speed by about 20 knots).
Non-Normal Checklist #1: Leading Edge Slat Asymmetry
When a leading edge slat asymmetry is detected hydraulic power to both
PDUs is automatically shut off. The pilot should not arm the alternate leading
edge drive system. The pilot should SET the Alternate Flaps Selector to agree
with the flap lever. Then the Trailing Edge Alternate Flaps Switch is pushed
on and ALTN is displayed. The Alternate Flaps Selector is then SET so that
the trailing edge flaps are extended/retracted as required. The pilot attempts to
get as much TE stall protection as possible without extending the LE slats any
farther.
Non-Normal Checklist #2: Trailing Edge Flap Asymmetry
When a trailing edge flap asymmetry is detected hydraulic power to
both PDUs is automatically shut off. The slats can be operated by the alternate
system. Alternate trailing edge operation is not used due to the lack of
asymmetry protection. If the asymmetry occurred at less than flaps 1, the
Alternative Flap Selector is set to flaps I and the LE Alternate Flaps Switch is
pushed on so that ALTN is displayed.
Typically, in the interest of safety, landing maneuvers are performed at
as low a speed as possible. In order to reduce the speed of the aircraft, the
coefficient of lift and/or the wing area must be increased. Usually, this
increase is accomplished through the use of slats and/or flaps on the aircraft's
wings. If a simultaneous leading edge slat asymmetry and trailing edge flap
asymmetry occurred on the wings, the pilot would have to maintain enough
speed for landing. This multiple failure is analogous to a zero-flap approach
since both the slats and flaps can not be extended due to position asymmetry.
During a zero-flap approach, the pilot should determine the stall speed and
land at 30 percent above this speed.
Checklist item: Fuel Pump Switche_
The Fuel Pump Switches are located in the center of the overhead panel
and are used to turn the electric fuel pumps on/off. If a tank runs out of fuel,
the pilot will see a low pressure light illuminated and the fuel quantity gauge
will read zero.
Non-Normal Checklist #1: Low Fuel
In this event, the pilot turns the crossfeed valve switch ON and all of
the Fuel Pump Switches ON so that both engines will operate as long as there
is fuel in any of the tanks.
Non-Normal Checklist #2: Gear Disagree
In this event, the pilot turns the pack control selectors OFF to
depressurize the cabin and turns the Fuel Pump Switches OFF to reduce the
possibility of fire upon landing. Since there is a gear disagree, the plane will be
"scraping metal" upon landing.
If the plane is low on fuel and the landing gear has not fully extended
(gear disagree procedure), a conflict in the position of the fuel pump switches
exists. Since the airplane will be "scraping metal" upon landing, the fuel
pump switches are turned off to prevent a fire from occurring. The
seriousness of a fire upon landing allows the gear disagree procedure to
supersede the low fuel procedure.
CONCLUSIONS
As a rule, multiple failures occurring in today's highly automated and
redundant system transport aircraft are extremely improbable. For this study,
a twin-engine transport with advances in propulsion, aerodynamics, avionics
and materials over early generation transport aircraft was chosen as a
representative aircraft in the transition from older transport aircraft to highly
automated glass cockpit aircraft. As shown in this analysis, conflicts among
checklist items in a multiple failure flight condition for a typical transport
aircraft are exceedingly unlikely. In fact, only six checklist items that have
conflicting commands for possible multiple failure combinations in the
transport aircraft used in this study have been identified. The estimated
likelihood of each failure condition (where applicable) and the non-normal
checklist having precedence in each of the possible multiple failure conditions
has also been determined. The possibility of a multiple failure flight condition
occurring with a conflict among checklist items is so remote that integrating
multiple checklists for non-normal procedures into a single procedure could
be done with relative ease. Special carewould need to be taken in those few
situations where conflicting commands on checklist items exist. A logical
next step by interested aircraft manufacturers would be to conduct trade
studies determining the feasibility of retrofitting older transport aircraft with
an electronic checklist capability.
APPENDIX A
Non-Normal Checklist Procedures Having Conflicting Commands of
Common Checklist Items
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NON-NORMAL CHECKLISTS
CHECKLIST ITEMS Cabin Altitude (Rapid, Cabin Engine Engine Bleed Engine Bleed Duct
Depressurization) Automatic Bleed Off Valve High Leak
Inoperative Stage
Fuel Control
Lanctin/_ Gear
Window Heat
Thrust Levers close
Outflow Valve
Enl_ine Bleed Air Switch
Isolation Switch
full open
off off then on;of; off off
on on on off
Pack Control Selector
Engine Start Selector
Ram Air Turbine
APU selector
climb/descend
Landin_ Altitude Selector
Cabin Altitude Manual Control
Utility Bus Switches
Alternate Flaps Selector
Alternate Flaps Switches
Crossfeed Valve Switch
Fuel Pump Switches
Auto Brakes Selector
CHECKLIST ITEMS
Fuel Control
Landin/_ Gear
Window Heat
NON-NORMAL CHECKLISTS
Pack Temperature Aborted Engine Fire,
Engine Start Severe
Damage or
Separation
cutoff;ran cutoff
Engine
Surge/Stall or
Hung/Slow
Acceleration
cutoff
Loss of Thrust
on Both
Engines
cutoff then run
Thrust Levers close close;advance close
Outflow Valve
Engine Bleed Air Switch off
Isolation Switch on on
stby-n;stby-dstby-w;oflPack Control Selector
EnBine Start Selector
Ram Air Turbine
grid;auto fit
APU selector
Landing Altitude Selector
Cabin Altitude Manual Control
Utility Bus Switches
Alternate Flaps Selector
Alternate Flaps Switches
Crossfeed Valve Switch
Fuel Pump Switches
Auto Brakes Selector
unlkd
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CHECKLIST ITEMS
Fuel Control
Lanaing Gear
Window Heat
Thrust Levers
Outflow Valve
Engine Bleed Air Switch
Isolation Switch
Pack Conlrol Selector
Engine Start Selector
Ram Air Turbine
APUselector
Lauding Altitude Selector
Cabin Altitude Manual Control
Utility Bus Switches
Alternate Flaps Selector
Alternate Flaps Switches
Crossfeed Valve Switch
Fuel Pump Switches
Auto Brakes Selector
NON-NORMAL CHECKLISTS
APU Fault
off then on
Electronic Engine
Control
retard to mid pos.
Engine
Failure
Shutdown
cutoff
Engine Inflight
Start
rich/run;run;run
Engine Limiter
close retard to mid pos.
on;off
off;auto
flti_a;auto
on
CHECKLIST ITEMS
Fuel Control
Lauding Gear
Window Heat
NON-NORMAL
Engine
Overileat
CHECKLISTS
Starter Engine Oil Pressure
Cutout Vibration
cutoff cutoff cutoff
Thrust Levers retard;close
Outflow Valve
Engine Bleed Air Switch off
IIsolation Switch on
Pack Control Selector
Engine Start Selector
Ram Air Turbine
APU selector
Lauding Altitude Selector
Cabin Altitude Manual Control
Utility Bus Switches
Alternate Flaps Selector
Alternate Flaps Switches
Crossfeed Valve Switch
Fuel Pump Switches
Auto Brakes Selector
Oil Temperature
cutoff
off
off
retard;dose close;adjust to mid pos. adjust to mid pos.;close
on on on
auto
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CHECKLIST ITEMS
NON-NORMAL
Reverser
Unlocked
Fuel Control cutoff
Landm/_ Gear
Window Heat
,Thrust Levers close
Outflow Valve
Engine Bleed Air Switch
Isolation Switch on
Pack Control Selector off
Engine Start Selector
Ram Air Turbine
APU selector
Landing Altitude Selector
Cabin Altitude Manual Control
Utility Bus Switches
Alternate Flaps Selector
Alternate Flaps Switches
Crossfeed Valve Switch
Fuel Pump Switches
Auto Brakes Selector
CHECKLISTS
Smoke Passenger Ditching
Removal Evacuation Preparation
up & off
open close
auto
analog
climb
off
climb
Door(s) iElectrical
9500 ft
Smoke or
Fire
off
AC Bus(es)
Off
push switch
off
NON-NORMAL CHECKLISTS
CHECKLIST ITEMS Utility Bus lLeading Trailing Leading Edg_ Trailing Fuel Low
I
Off Edge Slat Edge Flap Slat Edge Flap Pump Fuel
Disagree Disagree Asymmetry Asymmetry
Fuel Control
Landing Gear
Window Heat
Thrust Levers
Outflow Valve
Engine Bleed Air Switch
Isolation Switch
Pack Control Selector
Engine Start Selector
Ram Air Turbine
APU selector
Landing Altitude Selector
Cabin Altitude Manual Control
Utility Bus Switches
Alternate Flaps Selector
Alternate Flaps Switches
Crossfeed Valve Switch
Fuel Pump Switches
Auto Brakes Selector
off then on
set set set
almioff altn;off altn altn
on;off on
on
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CHECKLIST ITEMS
Fuel Control
Landtn8 Gear
Window Heat
NON-NORMAL CHECKLISTS
Hydraulic Wing Arcing/DclaminateA
System(s) Anti-Ice Shattered or Cracked
Pressure Wmdow
off
Thrust Levers
Outflow Valve
off'Engine Bleed Air Switch
Isolation Switch off
Pack Control Selector
Engine Start Selector
Ram Air Turbine
APUselector
Landin_ Altitude Selector
Cabin Altitude Manual Control
Utility Bus Switches
Alternate Flaps Selector
Alternate Flaps Switches
Crossfeed Valve Switch
set
altn
Fuel Pump Switches
Auto Brakes Selector
Window (Heat)
off 10 sec then on;off
Wheel Wel
Fire
dn
CHECKLIST ITEMS
Fuel Control
I._ding Gear
Window Heat
Thrust Levers
OutflOW Valve
Engine Bleed Air Switch
Isolation Switch
Pack Control Selector
Engine Start Selector
Ram Air Turbine
APU selector
Landing Altitude Selector
Cabin Altitude Manual Control
Utility Bus Switches
Alternate Flaps Selector
Alternate Flaps Switches
Crossfeed Valve Switch
Fuel Pump Switches
Auto Brakes Selector
NON-NORMAL CHECKLISTS
Gear Disagree
off
Aumbrakes
rcselcct;off
Brake
Source
off
off
Gear Doors
up
Gear Lever Will Not
Move Up
up
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APPENDIX B
Checklist Items Common to Multiple Non-Normal Checklist Procedures and
Non-Normal Checklist Procedures Having Precedence in a Multiple Failure
Flight Condition of a Transport Aircraft.
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Checklist items Common to Multiple Non-Normal Checklist Procedures:
Fuel Control
Landing Gear
Window Heat
Thrust Levers
Outflow Valve
Engine Bleed Air Switch
Isolation Switch
Pack Control Selector
Engine Start Selector
Ram Air Turbine
APU Selector
Cabin Altitude Manual Control
Utility Bus Switches
Alternate Flaps Selector
Alternate Flaps Switch
Crossfeed Valve Switch
Fuel Pump Switches
Auto Brakes Selector
Summarized below are fine non-normal procedures that had differing commands for a specific
instrument or piece of equipment. After each summary, a conflict is noted if it could occur among
fine procedures. Then fine procedure which takes precedence in this multiple failure flight
situation is indicated and discussed.
FUEL CONTROL :
General Notes on Fuel Control
The Fuel Control Switch can be placed in 3 positions: RUN, RICH, and CUTOFF. The RUN
position is the normal position for flight. In this position, fine selected igniter(s) are activated
and fine engine and spar fuel valves are opened. Turning the Fuel Control Switch to fine RICH
position initially schedules additional fuel for fine start, activates the selected igniter(s), and
opens fine engine and spar valves. The CUTOFF position closes fine engine and spar fuel valves
and terminates ignition. In the normal checklist the Fuel Control Switch is in the RUN position
except for the procedures BEFORE START and SHUTDOWN. For these two procedures, the Fuel
Control Switch is in the CUTOFF position.
With the Fuel Control Switch in the RICH or RUN position, ignition can occur in the following
four situations:
• start sequence
• selected by switch
• flaps not up
• engine anti-ice on
Typically the Fuel Control is in the RUN position for the entire flight. There are three
procedures in the non-normal procedures spreadsheet in which it is always CUTOFF:
1. Engine Fire, Severe Damage, or Separation
2. Oil Pressure (drops below limits)
3. Reverser Unlocked
The remaining conflicting procedures are discussed below:
4. Aborted Engine Start
As the pilot pushes back from the gate, he/she starts fine engine. An aborted engine
start might be caused by a hung engine or by a set of inoperable igniters. If this situation is
encountered, fine pilot will put the Fuel Control Switch in the CUTOFF position and then try to
restart the engine. When restarting the engine, fine Fuel Control Switch is put in fine RUN
position.
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5. EngineSurge/Stallor Hung/Slow Acceleration
After turning the Fuel Control Switch to the CUTOFF position, the pilot would try to
restart the engine. He/she might be able to fix the engine which is running abnormally by
easing the throttle back until the affected engine is able to produce thrust. A compressor stall is
typically resolved by reducing the thrust. A hung engine occurs when the plane is operating at a
low speed and the engine won't respond to the throttle. To alleviate a hung engine, the pilot
would perform a shutdown and then restart.
6. Loss of Thrust on Both Engines
Loss of thrust might occur if there's no fuel, extremely heavy precipitation (very
unusual) or an encounter with volcanic ash. In any case, the pilot would shutdown the engines
(Fuel Control Switch in the CUTOFF position) and then try to restart (Fuel Control Switch in
the RUN position).
7. Engine Failure/Shutdown
The pilot would close the thrust levers, turn the Fuel Control Switch in the CUTOFF
position, and start the APU (if available).
8. Engine Overheat
The pilot would retard the throttle and try to control the aircraft at a reduced thrust
level. If the engine overheat light remains illuminated, the pilot would accomplish the Engine
Failure/Shutdown procedure which states that the Fuel Control Switch is put in the CUTOFF
position.
9. Engine Vibration
The pilot would try to find a power setting where the vibration is eliminated or
tolerable. If an appropriate setting isn't found, the engine is shut off (Fuel Control Switch is put
in the CUTOFF position).
10. Oil Temperature
The pilot will try to operate the plane at an increased power level (more fuel flow) to
cool the oil. Oil is cooled by the fuel and the fuel is warmed by the oil. Once the engine reaches
it's temperature limit, the pilot would shut if off (Fuel Control Switch in the CUTOFF
position).
SUMMARY FOR FUEL CONTROL no conflict
Pilot actions within the 10 procedures aren't really in conflict. If a limit is reached and
retarding the throttle doesn't alleviate the problem, the fuel control is put in the CUTOFF
position. For 3 specific cases, the fuel control switch is always turned to the CUTOFF position.
For thrust aberrations in the engine, the fuel control switch is turned to the CUTOFF position
and then the pilot restarts the engine (Fuel Control Switch in the RUN position). If the problem
is not corrected by restarting the engine, then the fuel control switch is turned to the CUTOFF
position.
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LANDING GEAR:
General Notes on Landing Gear:
The landing gear system is controlled by the Landing Gear lever which has three positions (UP,
OFF, and DN). On the ground, the Landing Gear lever is prevented from being moved to the LIP
position by the lever lock. The lever lock can be manually overridden by pushing the Lever Lock
Override Switch if retraction is desired.
In the OFF position, the landing gear system is depressurized. All gears and doors are held in
the retracted position by a mechanical lock (uplock).
1. Ditching Preparation
Ditching only occurs when the plane is unflyable and over water. During ditching, the
landing gear is raised UP and then turned OFF. Turning the Landing Gear off removes the
hydraulic pressure from the system and secures the landing gear in uplocks.
2. Hydraulic System(s) Pressure
If there was a hydraulic system pressure failure in the left and center hydraulic
systems, the landing gear is turned OFF and an alternate gear extension system pushes it down.
Then the main Landing Gear is put in the DN position so that it's position is consistent with
that of the alternate gear extension system. This alternative flap operation and alternative
gear extension may also be required if there was a hydraulic system pressure failure in the left
and center systems or in the left system only.
3. Wheel Well Fire
Within a few minutes of takeoff, the brakes may become too hot because of a
malfunctioning brake or bad piloting technique. To cool the brakes off, put the Landing Gear DN
and let the air cool them. After 20 minutes, the Landing Gear may be retracted.
4. Gear Disagree
If the Landing Gear lever is DN and if any gear down lights are not illuminated, then
the pilots puts the Landing Gear lever in the OFF position and uses the altemate gear extension
system. Then the Landing Gear lever is put in the DN position so that its position is consistent
with that of the alternate gear extension system.
5. Gear Doors
If the gear doors do not fully close and the gear lever is in the off position, then the pilot
puts the Landing Gear UP.
6. Gear Lever Will Not Move Up
Since the Landing Gear lever can't be positioned in the UP position, the pilot pushes the
lever lock override switch. Then, he/she puts the Landing Gear lever in the UP position.
SUMMARY FOR LANDING GEAR conflict
The likelihood of conflicting procedures happening is very rare. If there were a gear
doors and a hydraulic system(s) failure occurring at the same time, the pilot would follow the
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checklist for the latter situation. If the gear doors don't close, the pilot may be forced to refuel
at an airport enroute or return to the departure airport because of the increase in drag associated
with the open doors. A flight would not depart over water with any landing gear malfunction;
hence the ditching conflict is not an issue.
WINDOW HEAT:
1. Shutdown
The Window Heat is turned OFF.
2. Arcing/Delaminated/Shattered or Cracked Windows
In arcing, the material fails so the window overheats and this could cause window
failure. In a delaminated window, the conductive film begins to separate from the windshield.
A shattered or cracked window is an extremely rare occurrence. Each pane in the airplane is
capable of withstanding the pressure on the aircraft. If a window cracks, the pilot should go to
a lower altitude to depressurize. For all 3 cases, the pilot should turn the Window Heat OFF.
3. Window (heat)
The pilot should switch the Window Heat OFF for 10 seconds and then back ON. If the
problem is not corrected, the pilot should switch the window heat OFF.
SUMMARY FOR WINDOW (HEAT_ no conflict
The 3 procedures for the Window Heat do not conflict with each other. In almost all
circumstances when the integrity of the window has been compromised, the Window Heat is
turned off.
THRUST LEVERS:
General Notes on Thrust Levers:
The thrust levers are provided to control engine forward thrust requirements from idle to
maximum power.
1. Cabin Altitude (Rapid Depressurization)
Bombs or structural failures are some of the causes of rapid depressurization. During
flight, air (high pressure and very hot) is bled from the engines and then cooled through the air
conditioning pack. This cooled air is then pumped into the aircraft cabin. Pressurization is
controlled by how much air flows out of the cabin.
The FAA has a prescribed time in which an aircraft cabin must become a habitable
environment after depressurization occurs. The FAA procedure assumes the plane is structurally
intact. At very high altitudes (above 35000 feet), a person (depending on age and physical
condition) can stay conscious about 30 seconds (Jeppesen, 1994). Below 14000 ft, most people can
work without oxygen.
During rapid depressurization, the aircraft crew has 5 seconds to don their oxygen
masks. To descend to an acceptable altitude, the pilot pulls the throttle back (CLOSES the
Thrust Levers) and uses the speed brake to enable the plane to have a high rate of descent.
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2. Engine Fire, Severe Damage or Separation
During these situations, the pilot CLOSEs the Thrust Levers to identify which engine to
shutdown. Each engine has a separate fuel shutoff, fire handle and thrust lever.
3. Engine Surge/Stall or Hung/Slow Acceleration
A compressor (engine) stall sounds like the engine has exploded. People in the aircraft
feel a tremendous vibration. An air flow disruption during compression is the typical cause of an
engine stall. To alleviate this problem, the pilot will CLOSE the Thrust Levers to try to
eliminate the compression stall. Then, he/she will slowly ADVANCE the Thrust Levers to try
to restart the engine if the EGT is stabilized or decreasing.
4. Loss of thrust on Both Engines
This situation is extremely rare. When it occurs, the pilot CLOSEs the Thrust Levers so
that he/she can shutoff the engines.
5. Electronic Engine Control
Each fuel controller has an electronic control. If the electronic control fails, then the
automatic protection in the plane's throttle system is lost. The automatic overboost protection is
disabled when the electronic control fails. To protect the system, the pilot RETARDs the
Thrust Levers TO MID POSITION so that the system isn't overboosted.
6. Engine Failure/Shutdown
This procedure is initiated for a host of reasons including low oil pressure, engine
vibration and fuel system failure. During this procedure, the pilot CLOSEs the Thrust Lever to
the affected engine. Unless there's an obvious cause for the engine failure, the pilot should
always try to restart the engine.
7. Engine Limiter
This procedure is the same as the electronic engine control. The electronic engine control
component won't allow the pilot to exceed the maximum rate of thrust.
8. Engine Overheat
The compressed airishot so itiscooled through the aircondition pack. If the airistoo
hot,the pilotRETARDs the Thrust Levers so thatthe pressure and heat are reduced. Hopefully
at some lower power setting,the engine willreach an acceptabletemperature. Ifnot, the pilot
willhave to perform the Engine/Failure Shutdown procedure which tellshim/her to CLOSE
the Thrust Lever of the affected engine.
9. Engine Vibration
The pilot will RETARD the Thrust Lever to try to eliminate the vibration. Typically,
ice can cause engine vibration. If the vibration can't be eliminated, the pilot will have to
perform the Engine/Failure Shutdown procedure which instructs him/her to CLOSE the Thrust
Lever of the affected engine.
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10.Oil Pressure
If the oil pressure limits are exceeded, the pilot always performs the Engine/Failure
Shutdown procedure which instructs him/her to CLOSE the Thrust Lever of the affected engine.
If the oil pressure is in the amber band, then the pilot ADJUSTs the Thrust Levers TO MID
POSITION.
11. Oil Temperature
Assuming the engine has become too hot at idle, the pilot will ADJUST the Thrust
Levers TO MID POSITION to try to reach the appropriate temperature limits. In aircraft, the
(hot) oil and (cool) fuel are used to stabilize each other's temperature. If the oil temperature is
too hot, then more fuel is used to try to cool it. If the temperature doesn't decrease below the red
line limit, then the pilot accomplishes the Engine/Failure Shutdown procedure which tells
him/her to CLOSE the Thrust Lever of the affected engine.
12. Reverser Unlocked
This situation occurs when any component of the thrust is not in the forward thrust
position. The pilot CLOSEs the Thrust Levers as soon as possible to shut the engine off. He/she
might have to pull back on the other engine throttle to maintain directional control.
SUMMARY FQR THRUST LEVERS no conflict
Pilot actions within the 12 procedures aren't really in conflict. If a limit is reached and
PLACING the Thrust Levers IN THE MID POSITION doesn't alleviate the problem, then they
are CLOSED. If there is a serious problem (rapid depressurization, engine fire, loss of engine
thrust, etc.), the Thrust Levers are always CLOSED.
OUTFLOW VALVE:
General Notes on Outflow Valve:
The cabin outflow valve is controlled by three systems, two automatic and one manual, to
maintain proper cabin pressurization in the aircraft. A single outflow valve is located at the
rear of the aircraft. Besides the outflow valve, there are small calibrated leaks throughout the
aircraft. The emergency relief valve which prevents overpressurization of the aircraft is
another "hole" in the plane.
1. Cabin Automatic Inoperative
If the cabin automatic is inoperative, the pilot should use the cabin altitude manual
control. During landing, the Outflow Valve should be FULL OPEN so that there is no cabin
pressurization. If a problem occurred during landing and the outflow valve wasn't full open, the
cabin pressurization would inhibit the airplane door from opening and the passengers and crew
would be trapped inside the plane.
2. Passenger Evacuation
During passenger evacuation, the aircraft is on the ground. The Outflow Valve should
be OPEN (no cabin pressurization) so the passengers and crew can get off the plane.
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3. Ditching Preparation
During ditching preparation, the aircraft is in the water. The Outflow Valve should be
CLOSEd so that no water enters the cabin. The aircraft floats because of the buoyancy force
caused by the air that has replaced the used fuel in the wings. (Prior to landing in the water the
Outflow Valve should have been opened to equalize the cabin pressure and the ambient air
pressure.)
SUMMARY FOR OUTFLOW VALVE no conflict
If the cabin automatic positioning for the outflow valve is inoperative and the pilot is
performing a ditching maneuver, the following actions should be performed. For ditching, the
aircraft cabin needs to be depressurized so that the doors will open once in the water and the
slides can be put out. However, once the slides are out, the outflow valve needs to be closed so
that the aircraft is a little more seaworthy. If the cabin automatic positioning for the outflow
valve is inoperative, then manual positioning of the outflow valve is used to maintain proper
cabin pressurization. During landing, the outflow valve should be full open so that there is no
cabin pressurization. No conflict occurs because the operation (close/open) of the outflow valve
happens at different times during the conflict.
ENGINE BLEED AIR SWITCH:
General Notes on Engine Bleed Air:
Engine bleed air (pneumatic air) is used for air conditioning (a/c) packs, starting the engines, and
de-icing of wings and engine lip. The engine bleed air has a very high temperature and it's
extracted from either the low stage or the high stage (further down the engine) source.
Extracting the air reduces the thrust to the engine. During takeoff, the engine bleed air is taken
from the low stage source. At low power settings, the low stage pressure isn't powerful enough to
operate the system so the air is extracted from the high stage pressure source.
In a typical transport aircraft, the engine bleed is on during takeoff (t/o). If additional thrust is
needed at takeoff (because of high gross weight, high temperature, short runway, high altitude
airport, etc.), the pilot turns the engine bleed off.
The a/c packs provide pressurization and air conditioning to the aircraft. The starter for the jet
engine is a pneumatic starter. A pneumatic leak is a serious condition because of the very hot air
and it's treated almost with the same amount of concern as a fire.
1. Engine Bleed Off
If there's a fault in one side of the system ( i.e., a leak develops or the pilot can't control
temperature), the pilot turns the Engine Bleed Air Switch OFF for that side of the system.
During takeoff and roll, the bleed air in the system comes from the initial stages of compression.
During landing, the bleed air is taken from the high pressure part of the engine.
2. Engine Bleed Valve
The engine bleed valve is electrically armed and operated by the pressure of the
medium it's controlling. If pneumatic pressure is available, the valve will open/close. If the
engine valve is open even though it should be closed, the pilot should try to cycle through the
system once (Engine Bleed Air Switch turned OFF/ON). If cycling through the system doesn't
alleviate the problem, the Engine Bleed Air Switch should be turned OFF. In flight, bleed air is
used for a/c packs and for anti-icing. If just one engine valve switch is working during flight, it
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should be used primarily for anti-icing. The Bleed Air Switch is turned OFF for the inoperative
engine bleed valve.
3. Engine High Stage
Engine High Stage is caused by over pressure in the engine bleed system. The pilot can't
reset the system so he/she should close the engine bleed valve by turning the Bleed Air Switch
OFF.
4. Bleed Duct Leak
A temperature sensor runs along the outside of the bleed duct. If a duct leak occurs, the
temperature sensor will sense a temperature rise. The pilot then shuts down that half of the
system (Engine Bleed Air Switch OFF).
5. Engine Surge/Stall or Hung/Slow Acceleration
The engine bleed system takes air away from the engine so the engine efficiency is
reduced. If the engine bleed air switch is not operating properly, an engine surge might develop.
During an engine surge, the engine is speeding up and down. A stall is caused by a disruption in
the airflow. Typically, a severe vibration is felt. The pilot might also see fire coming out of the
engine. For either of these situations, the pilot should turn OFF the Bleed Air Switch.
6. Engine Overheat
The pilot will turn the Engine Bleed Air Switch OFF because a temperature regulator
has failed.
7. Starter Cutout
Pneumatic air is provided to the starter. At a certain rpm, the starter is shutoff. If the
signal to the starter fails, the starter will continue to run. The starter will eventually burn out if
it continues to run. If the starter fails to cutout, the pilot shuts OFF the Engine Bleed Air
Switch.
8. Wing Anti-Ice
After landing the Engine Bleed Air Switch is turned OFF because the wing anti-ice is
designed to be used in flight not on the ground. Since the wings are made of aluminum, they can
be weakened by the high temperature bleed air. If the wing anti-ice is stuck in the "on"
position, there will be no cooling airflow available once the aircraft has landed and stopped on
the ground.
SUMMARY FOR ENGINE BLEED AIR SWITCH no conflict
There are no conflicts among the 8 procedures. If the bleed air system isn't functioning
properly, the Engine Bleed Air Switch is turned off. If the valve is in the wrong configuration,
the pilot tries cycling the switch on and off to correct the fault. If cycling doesn't correct the
fault, the Engine Bleed Air Switch is turned off.
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ISOLATION SWITCH
General Notes on Isolation Switch:
Normally, the Isolation Switch is closed (off). The Isolation Switch isolates (splits in half)
the pneumatic system of the aircraft. Failure on one side of the system doesn't affect the other
side. Pneumatic air is used for pressurization, starting the aircraft, and icing prevention on the
wings and engines. The engine bleed air (pneumatic air) has a very high temperature and
pressure and it's extracted from either the low stage or the high stage (further down the engine)
source. Extracting the air reduces the thrust to the engine. During t/o, the engine bleed air is
taken from the low stage source. At low power settings, the low stage pressure isn't powerful
enough to operate the system so the air is extracted from the high stage pressure source. The
pneumatic air usually comes from the low stage source.
I. Engine Bleed Off
If there's a fault in one side of the system ( i.e., a leak develops or the pilot can't control
temperature), the pilot turns the engine bleed air switch off for that side of the system. The
Isolation Switch is turned ON in order to use the pneumatic air from the other side of the system
for wing anti-ice (if necessary).
2. Engine Bleed Valve
The Isolation Switch is ON in order to use the pneumatic air for wing anti-ice (if
necessary). See notes from #1 on Engine Bleed Off procedures.
3. Engine High Stage
The Isolation Switch is ON in order to use the pneumatic air for wing anti-ice (if
necessary). See notes from #1 on Engine Bleed Off procedures.
4. Bleed Duct Leak
During a bleed duct leak, the pilot doesn't want to add pneumatic air to the leaking
component, so he/she turns the isolation valve OFF.
5. Engine Fire, Severe Damage or Separation
During this procedure, the engine is turned off. The pilot can reroute the pneumatic air
by turning the Isolation Switch ON thus supplying hot air (from the operational engine) for the
wing anti-ice (if necessary).
6. Engine Surge/Stall or Hung/Slow Acceleration
The same procedure is followed as described in the Engine Fire, Severe Damage or
Separation procedure (#5 in this section).
7. Engine Failure Shutdown
The same procedure is followed as described in the Engine Fire, Severe Damage or
Separation procedure (#5 in this section).
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8. Engine Inflight Start
If the engine is wind-milling at a certain speed and altitude, the pilot might need to use
the engine starter. If this is the case, the pilot would turn the Isolation Switch ON and then
turn it OFF after the engine inflight start.
9. Engine Overheat
The same procedure is followed as described in the Engine Fire, Severe Damage or
Separation procedure (#5 in this section).
10. Starter Cutout
During starter cutout, the valve is stuck open. The pilot should turn the Isolation Switch
OFF and use the bleed air switches to remove the pneumatic air from the system.
11. Engine Vibration
If the vibration is severe enough, the pilot will shut down the engine. Wing anti-ice
might be necessary so the Isolation Switch should be in the ON position.
12. Oil Pressure
The same procedure is followed as described in the Engine Fire, Severe Damage or
Separation procedure (#5 in this section).
13. Oil Temperature
The same procedure is followed as described in the Engine Fire, Severe Damage or
Separation procedure (#5 in this section).
14. Reverser Unlocked
The same procedure is followed as described in the Engine Fire, Severe Damage or
Separation procedure (#5 in this section).
15. Wing Anti-Ice
After landing, the pilot turns the Isolation Switch OFF to prevent wing anti-ice from
operating.
_IdMMARY FOR ISOLATION SWITCH conflict
A conflict in the position of the isolation switch can exist if the aircraft experiences an
engine failure and a bleed duct leak on the opposite side of the failed engine. In this multiple
failure situation, the pilot would turn the isolation switch off and perform an emergency descent
procedure. The bleed duct leak procedure takes precedence over the engine failure procedure
since a bleed duct leak can damage electrical wire insulation and can weaken aluminum near the
affected area of the leak. When an aircraft has a bleed duct leak, the pilot must take special
caution to avoid icing situations because the isolation switch must remain off which disables the
wing anti-ice for the affected side of the aircraft.
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PACKCONTROLSELECTOR
General Notes on Pack Control Selector
There are 2 packs in the transport; either pack will maintain pressurization. The packs supply
air through ducting to flight deck, forward cabin, and aft cabin.
1. Pack Temperature
The pack temperature is automatically controlled by a specified dial setting. These
settings are STBY-C (cold), STBY-W (warm), and STBY-N (normal). If an overheat or fault in
the associated zone temperature system is sensed, the INOP light comes on. The pilot should
select STBY-N first. If the compartment temperature becomes unacceptably warm or cool select
STBY-C or STBY-W, respectively. If INOP light does not extinguish, turn the Pack Control
Selector OFF for the associated zone temperature system.
2. Engine Inflight Start
Turn one pack control selector OFF to reduce pneumatic load so that all of the engine
bleed air (pneumatic air) is available for the starters. Once the engine starts, turn the one Pack
Control Selector to AUTO.
3. Reverser Unlocked
During Reverser Unlock, the pilot must perform an engine shutdown so the Pack Control
Selector is turned OFF. The pilot turns the Pack Control Selector off so that there is no
pneumatic air on that side.
4. Smoke Removal
The Pack Control Selectors remain on AUTO. The pilot should raise the cabin altitude
which will open the outflow valve to a more open position thus enabling more air flow through
the cabin. The outflow valve will open wider because there's less pressure in the cabin.
5. Ditching Preparation
The Pack Control Selectors are turned OFF so that the airplane depressurizes and the
passengers can be evacuated. The outflow valve should be manually closed.
6. Gear Disagree
Typically during landing, the cabin pressure is reduced to low limits. As the plane
touches down, the outflow valve opens fully to depressurize the aircraft. If there is a gear
disagree (one part of the landing gear is up), the aircraft won't automatically depressurize. The
pilot can depressurize the aircraft before landing by turning the Pack Control Selector OFF.
SUMMARY FOR PACK CONTROL SELECTOR conflict
A conflict occurs in the positioning of the pack control selector in the smoke removal
procedure and the pack temperature non-normal procedure. Due to it's serious nature, the smoke
removal procedure takes precedence over the pack temperature procedure. If the smoke can not
be removed, the pilot must accomplish the earliest possible descent, landing and passenger
evacuation.
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ENGINESTARTSELECTOR
General Notes on Engine Start Selector
Pushing in and rotating the Engine Start Selector to the GND position, opens the start valve,
engages the air driven starter to the N3 spool, and closes the engine bleed air switch if it is open.
The Engine Start Selector is in GND position until the engine meets a certain speed
(approximately 50% N3) and then it automatically turns to AUTO position. In the AUTO
position, the starter automatically cuts out and the start valve closes stopping the flow of air to
the starter.
The Engine Start Selector controls operation of the starter and the ignition switch, and it is
normally in the AUTO position during flight. The ignition system always operates when the
flaps are in any position other than the UP position. In the FLT position, both igniters act
continuously. This position is used during adverse weather conditions such as heavy
precipitation.
(note: The Rolls Royce engine has 3 spools and the Pratt Whitney engine has 2 spools, N1 and
N2.)
1. Aborted Engine Start
The engine rotates and the fuel is on but the pilot discontinues the start because the
engine isn't engaging. To discontinue the start, the pilot turns off the fuel control switch. To
purge fuel from engine, the pilot uses the starter motor for another 20 seconds. As the engine
rotates, at 50 percent N3, the switch automatically goes from GND position to the AUTO
position which automatically turns off the starter and terminates ignition.
2. Loss of Thrust on Both Engines
The pilot puts the Engine Start Selector in the FLT position (both igniters) to try to get
thrust back before both engines have a chance to spool down.
3. Engine Inflight Start
If the engine is rotating fast enough, then the pilot doesn't need pneumatic pressure to
start the engine so he/she uses the FLT position. If pneumatic pressure is needed to start the
aircraft, then the pilot uses the GND-AUTO procedure.
4. Starter Cutout
If the starter cuts out, there will be a rise in pneumatic pressure. If the pilot doesn't see a
rise in pressure, he/she must manually attempt to close the starter valve. The pilot attempts
this action by moving the Engine Start Selector to AUTO. If this action doesn't alleviate the
problem, the pilot must shut down the engine because the aircraft should not be flown with the
starter valve "open". If the starter valve is "open" at a speed above 50% N3, it could be
damaged by the engine.
SUMMARY FOR ENGINE START SELECTOR no conflict
The inflight engine start procedure could end up with an aborted engine start but the
procedures are similar at this point. So, there are no conflicts among the procedures.
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RAM AIR TURBINE
General Notes on Ram Air Turbine
There is no manual reversion of flight controls on modem transport aircraft because of it's size
and weight. The forces felt by the control surfaces are too great for a pilot to manually fly.
Without hydraulic pressure, the pilot has no flight controls. To provide redundancy in
hydraulic pressure, a Ram Air Turbine drops into the slipstream and gives the pilot enough
hydraulics to handle the essential controls of the aircraft. With the Ram Air Turbine, the
propeller turns the hydraulic pump and the hydraulic lines run through the aircraft.
1. Loss of Thrust on Both Engines
If thrust is lost on both engines, the Ram Air Turbine automatically drops down into the
slipstream and a light illuminates which says UNLOCKED.
2. AC Bus(es) Off
Each engine has an engine driven hydraulic pump and each hydraulic pump has an
electric pump. There is a left and right (L&R) system associated with each engine. There is a
center system corresponding to operation by electrical pumps and ram air turbine pump. If center
system fails, then the Ram Air Turbine is activated by PUSHING THE SWITCH (Ram Air
Turbine Switch). All pumps (hydraulic and electric) except the Ram Air Turbine pump are
always on in normal flight.
SUMMARY FOR RAM AIR TURBINE no conflict
There are no conflicts among the two procedures.
APU SELECTOR
General Notes on APU Selector
The APU is used normally as a source of electrical and pneumatic power for the air conditioning
on the ground. It is also used as pneumatic power for start on the ground. It is the backup source
for the two engine driven generators. In the air, the APU is used only as an electric source not as
a pneumatic source. Everything on the APU is automatic.
1. APU Fault
When starting the aircraft, if the pilot turns on the APU and the fault light doesn't go
out then the system automatically shuts down. The pilot can reset the faulted circuits by turning
the APU Selector OFF then ON.
2. AC Bus(es) Off
If there's been a massive electrical failure, the L or R bus would be isolated and the APU
power wouldn't be able to get through the system. Therefore, the APU Selector should be turned
OFF.
SUMMARY FOR APU SELECTOR no conflict
There are no conflicts among the two procedures.
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CABIN ALTITUDE MANUAL CONTROL
General Notes on Cabin Altitude Manual Control
The Cabin Altitude Manual Control controls the cabin outflow valve position with the Altitude
Mode Selector in the Man mode. The pilot positions the outflow valve with respect to the cabin
altitude rate of climb. For level flight, the cabin altitude rate is equal to zero. If the outflow
valve is opened to a more full position, the pressure differential between cabin pressure and the
outside air is lessened and an increase in the cabin altitude is indicated. This technique is used
for smoke removal because the increase in air flow through the cabin gets rid of the smoke
quicker. This technique is also used for passenger evacuation because the pilot wants to
depressurize the aircraft so that the doors will open. The cabin altitude essentially reduces to
zero at landing. If a slight altimeter error exists, there might be a small pressure differential
which would keep the aircraft door from opening. On landing, the outflow valve is in the full
open position so that there is no cabin pressure differential.
As the engine thrust increases, the pneumatic pressure in the packs increases and this increase
tends to drive down the cabin altitude.
The Cabin Altitude Manual Control can be rotated to the CLIMB or DESCEND position. In the
CLIMB position, the cabin outflow valve opens to increase cabin altitude. In the DESCEND
position, the valve closes to reduce cabin altitude.
1. Cabin Automatic Inoperative
The pilot manually adjusts the cabin outflow valve by rotating the Cabin Altitude
Manual Control either toward the CLIMB or DESCEND markings. The captain pays close
attention to the cabin rate of climb indicator, the cabin pressure differential indicator, and the
cabin altimeter.
2. Smoke Removal
The pilot manually adjusts the cabin outflow valve by rotating the Cabin Altitude
Manual Control toward the CLIMB marking. Thus there is more air flow through the cabin so
the smoke is removed more quickly.
3. Passenger Evacuation
The pilot manually adjusts the cabin outflow valve by rotating the Cabin Altitude
Manual Control toward the CLIMB marking. On landing, the outflow valve is in the full open
position so that there is no cabin pressure differential. By depressurizing the aircraft, the doors
can be opened for passenger evacuation.
SUMMARY FOR GABIN ALTITUDE MANUAL CONTROL no conflict
There are no conflicts among the three procedures.
UTILITY BUS SWITCHES
General notes on Utility Bus Switches
Power to the utility and galley buses is controlled by the Utility Bus Switches and the Load
Shed system. The Utility Bus Switches can always be used to disconnect the buses from the main
AC buses. The switches can also connect the buses, but only if there is no load shed signal.
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TheUtility BusSwitch can be in the ON or OFF position. In the ON position, if there is no load
shed signal present the utility and galley buses are connected to the main bus. In the OFF
position, the utility and galley buses are disconnected from the main AC bus.
1. Electrical Smoke or Fire
The likely source of smoke or fire in the cabin would be in the galley. Therefore, the
Utility Bus Switch is turned OFF.
2. Utility Bus Off
The pilot manually turns the Utility Bus Switch OFF and then ON.
SUMMARY FOR UTILITY BUS SWITCHES no conflict
There are no conflicts among the two procedures because electrical smoke or fire always
takes precedence.
ALTERNATE FLAPS SELECTOR
General Notes on Alternate Flaps Selector
Flap and slat position is controlled with the Flap Lever. When the Flap Lever is in the UP
detent, all flaps and slats are retracted and the flap position indicator points to UP. Moving the
flap lever to position I signals the slats and flaps to extend to position 1. Placing the flap lever
to position 5, 15, or 20 signals the flaps to extend to the selected position. The slats remain in the
takeoff (intermediate extended) position. Moving the flap lever to position 25 signals the flap
to extend to the selected setting and the slats to extend to their landing (fully extended)
position.
An alternate flap drive system allows the flap Power Drive Units (PDUs) to be driven by
electric motors rather than hydraulic power. During normal operations the Alternate Flaps
Selector is in the NORM (normal) position. There are two Alternate Flaps Switches, one for the
leading edge drive system and one for the trailing edge drive system. When the Alternate Flaps
Switch is pushed on, ALTN appears in the switch. Rotating the Alternate Flaps Selector
signals the flaps and slats to move to the pilot selected position (UP, 1, 5, 15, 20, or 25). Only
slat asymmetry proration is provided during alternate operations.
The electrical system is a lot slower than the hydraulic system when moving the flaps/slats.
Also, the leading edge devices have a more pronounced effect on landing speed than the trailing
edge devices (e.g. LE slats reduce stall speed by about 20 knots).
1. Leading Edge Slat Disagree
This situation occurs when the slats are not in or are not driving toward their
commanded position. Hydraulic power to both PDUs is automatically shut off. The pilot SETs
the Alternate Flaps Selector to agree with the flap lever. Then the Alternate Flaps Switch is
pushed on and ALTN is displayed. The Alternate Flaps Selector is then SET so that the flaps
are extended/retracted as required.
2. Trailing Flap Disagree
This situation occurs when the flaps are not in or are not driving toward their
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commandedposition.Hydraulic power to both PDUs is automatically shut off. The pilot SETs
the Alternate Flaps Selector to agree with the flap lever. Then the Alternate Flaps Switch is
pushed on and ALTN is displayed. The Alternate Flaps Selector is then SET so that the flaps
are extended/retracted as required.
3. Leading Edge Slat Asymmetry
When a leading edge slat asymmetry is detected hydraulic power to both PDUs is
automatically shut off. The pilot should not arm the alternate leading edge drive system. The
pilot should SET the Alternate Flaps Selector to agree with the flap lever. Then the Trailing
Edge Alternate Flaps Switch is pushed on and ALTN is displayed. The Alternate Flaps
Selector is then SET so that the trailing edge flaps are extended/retracted as required. The
pilot attempts to get as much TE stall protection as possible without extending the LE slats any
farther.
4. Trailing Edge Flap Asymmetry
When a trailing edge flap asymmetry is detected hydraulic power to both PDUs is
automatically shut off. The slats can be operated by the alternate system. Alternate trailing
edge operation is not used due to the lack of asymmetry protection. If the asymmetry occurred at
less than flaps 1, the Alternative Flaps Selector is set to flaps I and the LE Alternate Flaps
Switch is pushed on so that ALTN is displayed.
5. Hydraulic System(s) Pressure
If the Left and Right Hydraulic Systems are inoperative, the alternate flap operation
is required. The pilot should SET the Alternate Flaps Selector to agree with the flap lever.
Then the Alternate Flaps Switches are pushed on and ALTN is displayed. The Alternate Flaps
Selector is then SET so that the flaps are extended/retracted as required.
$1dMMARY FOR ALTERNATE FLAPS SELECTOR conflict
Typically in the interest of safety, landing maneuvers are performed at as low a speed
as possible. In order to reduce the speed of the aircraft, the coefficient of lift and/or the wing
area must be increased. Usually, this increase is accomplished through the use of slats and/or
flaps on the aircraft's wings. If a simultaneous leading edge slat asymmetry and trailing edge
flap asymmetry occurred on the wings, the pilot would have to maintain enough speed for
landing. This multiple failure is analogous to a zero-flap approach since the both the slats and
flaps can not be extended due to position asymmetry. During a zero-flap approach, the pilot
should determine the stall speed and land at 30 percent above this speed.
ALTERNATE FLAPS SWITCH
General Notes on Alternate Flaps Switch
See discussion in previous section entitled "General Notes on Alternate Flaps Selector".
1. Leading Edge Slat Disagree
This situation occurs when the slats are not in or are not driving toward their
commanded position. Hydraulic power to both PDUs is automatically shut off. The pilot sets
the Alternate Flaps Selector to agree with the flap lever. Then the Alternate Flaps Switch is
pushed on and ALTN is displayed. If, after selecting ALTN, the LE or TE light remains
illuminated, the pilot positions the associated Alternate Flaps Switch OFF and accomplishes
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theapplicableasymmetryprocedure.TheAlternateFlaps Selector is then set so that the flaps
are extended/retracted as required.
2. Trailing Flap Disagree
This situation occurs when the flaps are not in or are not driving toward their
commanded position. Hydraulic power to both PDUs is automatically shut off. The pilot sets
the Alternate Flaps Selector to agree with the flap lever. Then the Alternate Flaps Switch is
pushed on and ALTN is displayed. If, after selecting ALTN, the LE or TE light remains
illuminated, the pilot positions the associated Alternate Flaps Switch OFF and accomplishes
the applicable asymmetry procedure. The Alternate Flaps Selector is then set so that the flaps
are extended/retracted as required.
3. Leading Edge Slat Asymmetry
When a leading edge slat asymmetry is detected hydraulic power to both PDUs is
automatically shut off. The pilot should not arm the alternate leading edge drive system. The
pilot should set the Alternate Flaps Selector to agree with the flap lever. Then the Trailing
Edge Alternate Flaps Switch is pushed on and ALTN is displayed. The Alternate Haps
Selector is then set so that the trailing edge flaps are extended/retracted as required. The pilot
attempts to get as much TE stall protection as possible without extending the LE slats any
farther.
4. Trailing Edge Flap Asymmetry
When a trailing edge flap asymmetry is detected hydraulic power to both PDUs is
automatically shut off. The slats can be operated by the alternate system. Alternate trailing
edge operation is not used due to the lack of asymmetry protection. If the asymmetry occurred at
less than flaps 1, the Alternative Flaps Selector is set to flaps 1 and the LE Alternate Flaps
Switch is pushed on so that ALTN is displayed.
5. Hydraulic System(s) Pressure
If the Left and Right Hydraulic Systems are inoperative, the alternate flap operation
is required. The pilot should set the Alternate Flaps Selector to agree with the flap lever.
Then the Alternate Haps Switches are pushed on and ALTN is displayed. The Alternate Flaps
Selector is then set so that the flaps are extended/retracted as required.
SUMMARY FOR ALTERNATE FLAPS SWITCH conflict
Typically in the interest of safety, landing maneuvers are performed at as low a speed
as possible. In order to reduce the speed of the aircraft, the coefficient of lift and/or the wing
area must be increased. Usually, this increase is accomplished through the use of slats and/or
flaps on the aircraft's wings. If a simultaneous leading edge slat asymmetry and trailing edge
flap asymmetry occurred on the wings, the pilot would have to maintain enough speed for
landing. This multiple failure is analogous to a zero-flap approach since the both the slats and
flaps can not be extended due to position asymmetry. During a zero-flap approach, the pilot
should determine the stall speed and land at 30 percent above this speed.
CROSSFEED VALVE SWITCH
General Notes on Crossfeed Valve Switch
The Crossfeed Valve Switch is used to equalize the fuel loads in the wing tanks so that the
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aircraftiskeptbalanced.It isalsousedto keeptheaircraftbalancedin the event of an engine
loss. The Crossfeed Valve Switch is usually in the OFF (valve closed) position. The only time
it is turned ON (valve open) is if there is a slight difference in the engine bum between the main
engines. There are two center tanks (L and R) which feed the left and right engines. There are
two main tanks (L and R) located in the wings. The center tank pumps have more pressure than
the main tank pumps so the fuel is consumed out of the center tanks first and then the main tanks.
If the R tank pumps have too much fuel, the pilot will open the crossfeed valve and turn the L
tank pumps off. The fuel for the engines will then be coming from the R tank pumps. This process
continues until the wing tanks are balanced. Then, the L tank pumps are turned back on and the
crossfeed valve is closed.
1. Fuel Pump
If one of the center pumps fails, then the pilot turns ON the Crossfeed Valve Switch so
that the operating center pump fuels both the left and right engines. Once the center tank is
empty, the pilot turns OFF the Crossfeed Valve Switch to maintain balance in the wing tanks.
2. Low Fuel
In this event, the total fuel quantity is low. An indication light comes on when the fuel
quantity reaches 2200 lbs in either of the main tanks (L or R). The pilot turns the Crossfeed
Valve Switch ON so that any fuel that is available for the engines can be used.
SUMMARY FOR CROSSFEED VALVE SWITCH no conflict
There are no conflicts among the two procedures. The center tanks are emptied first (Fuel
Pump procedure) and then the main tanks are used (Low Fuel procedure).
FUEL PUMP SWITCHES
General Notes on Fuel Pump Switches
The Fuel Pump Switches are located in the center of the overhead panel and are used to turn the
electric fuel pumps on/off. If a tank runs out of fuel, the pilot will see a low pressure light
illuminated and the fuel quantity gauge will read zero.
1. Low Fuel
In this event, the pilot turns the crossfeed valve switch ON and all of the Fuel Pump
Switches ON so that both engines will operate as long as there is fuel in any of the tanks.
2. Gear Disagree
In this event, the pilot turns the pack control selectors OFF to depressurize the cabin and
turns the Fuel Pump Switches OFF to reduce the possibility of fire upon landing. Since there is a
gear disagree, the plane will be "scraping metal" upon landing.
SUMMARY FOR FUEL PUMP SWITCHES conflict
If the plane is low on fuel and the landing gear has not fully extended (gear disagree
procedure), a conflict in the position of the fuel pump switches exists. Since the airplane will be
"scraping metal" upon landing, the fuel pump switches are turned off to prevent a fire from
occurring. The seriousness of a fire upon landing allows the gear disagree procedure to supersede
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thelowfuelprocedure.
AUTO BRAKES SELECTOR
General Notes on Auto Brakes Selector
The Auto Brakes Selector has 5 settings (1, 2, 3, 4 and MAX AUTO) corresponding to increasing
auto brakes deceleration rates. The auto brakes system permits automatic braking at a pre-
selected deceleration rate following touchdown. The maximum autobrakes deceleration rate
(MAX AUTO) is less than the amount produced by full manual braking.
After landing with the auto brakes system armed, the brakes are applied when both Thrust
Levers are at idle. The preselected deceleration rate is maintained throughout the landing by
reducing the auto brakes pressure when other deceleration devices (speedbrakes and thrust
reversers) are operating.
There are four ways to disengage the auto brake system:
1. Rotate the Auto Brakes Selector to the DISARM or OFF position
2. Manual braking
3. Pushing the speedbrake handle forward
4. Advancing either throttle
It depends on pilot preference on whether the auto brake system is using during landing.
However, both Boeing and Lockheed have stated that brake wear on the aircraft is less when
the auto brake system is used consistently than when it's not used.
1. Autobrakes
If the pilot sees the auto brakes message light illuminated, then he/she RESELECTs the
appropriate deceleration rate with the Auto Brakes Selector. If the auto brakes light re-
illuminates, then the Auto Brakes Selector is turned to the OFF position.
2. Brake Source
If the brake source light illuminated, then the normal and alternate brake system
pressure is low. For this situation, the pilot turns the Reserve Brake Switch on. If the reserve
brake source light remains illuminated, then the pilot turns the Auto Brakes Selector OFF. At
this point only accumulator pressure is available for the brakes so the pilot applies steady,
increasing brake pressure and holds this pressure until the aircraft comes to a full stop.
SUMMARY FOR AUTO BRAKES SELECTOR no conflict
There are no conflicts among the two procedures.
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